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on 19 December 1980 a motion for a resolution on the European Monctary
system (Doc' l-761/80) tabred by Mr RUFFoLo and others was referred to the
committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs as the committee responsible.
At its meeting of January 2o-2r 1981 the committee on Economic and
Monetary Affairs appointed Mr pURVIS as rapporteur.
The committee considered the draft report at its meetings of 24_25
November, 3-4 December lggL and 26-27 January r9g2 and adopted it at the
latter meeting by 10 votes to 2 vrith g abstentions.
Participated in the vote:
I{r J. Moreau, (chairman), Mr de Ferranti, (vice-chairman), IvIr Deleau, (vice-chairman),
IvIr Purvis, (Rapporteur), Ivlr Beazley, Mr von Bismarck, Mr Bonaccini, IlLr carossino(deputizing for Mr Leonardi), urs Desouches, IvIr r. Friedrich, trttr de Goede,
IvIr Hopper, IvIr l"IarshaLl (deupitzing for Miss Forster), ltr Ir4ihr, IvIr papantoniou,
Ivlr Rogers, I/Lr van Rompuy, IvIr Ruffolo, Sir Brandon'Rhys WilJ-iams, !{r von wogau.
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Motion for a resolution tabledEuropean Monetary System (Doc. by Mr Ruffolo on the7-7 6t/ 80)
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A.
The Commit-tere orr Economic and Monet.ary Affairs hereby submit-s to thc
European Parliament the fotlowing motion for a reso}ution, together with
ex1:l anatory statement :
MOTION FOR A RESOI,UTION
on the European Monetary System
Tile_E riIsp. e qI__B 
" 
r r t gle n!,
- noting the relatively stable rel-ationship marntained between those
currencies which are full members of the EMS exchange raLe meehanism
despite the adjustments made to it,
- noting, by contrast, the extreme volatility of sterling against these
currencies,
- stressing the cconomic and indust-ria1 benefits of relative stability
in exchange rates and the economic and industrial difficulties that
can be caused by volatility in cxchange rates,
- and convinced that the EEC economy as a whole outweighs in potential
the sum of its national Parts,
- but aware that the Fll'lS, as presently constructed, is only a means to an
end (i.e. Economlc and Monetary Unlon) and is therefore Ln an inherently
precarious state,
- and conscious that t-his precarious state will be accentuated by continuing
divergenciesin national inflation rates and economic policies, which Prevent
further steps belng taken towards complete elimlnatlon of exehange rate
vari at i ons ,
- 
alrare of the reluctance of the governmente and monetary authoritiee of t'hc
lvlember States to relinquish even a part of their monetary sovereignty'' for
fear of losing control over their own economic sLtuation,
- 
notlng the Council of Ministere' faiLure to act and the Commission's lack
of conrnitment as regards attaining the conditions for the transition to the
second stage of the EI,Ls provided for in the original agreements,
- 
having regard to the draft fifth medium term economic pollcy progralune
1prepared by the eommiseion,-
- 
having regard to its resolution of October L981 on the realignment of
monetary Paritiesrz
- having regard 
.to the nlotion for a resolution (Doc. l-76L/80),
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monet-ary
Af fairs (L-91L/TLI i 
.
I cola(Bt) 344 fin.
2 ot czal
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1. Reaffirms its complete commitment to the goar of European
economj.c integration
a) as being jn the economic and political interests of the EuropeanCommunity, its industries and its people;
b) as bei.ng a stabilising influence jn the worLd economyi
c) as providing thereby the potential of an arternative to the us dorrarin world trade and inveetment flows;
d) and 'potentiarly helping to alleviate the world recession caused byimbalances in the world,s money f10ws since the 1g73 0i1 price crisis.
2. Urges the setting up of a,Europaan currency Anthority, wlth a high levelof autonomy, which wiII be chargeda
a ) to issue and manage a European Currency Unit
fr) to provide a means of eettlenent and store oftrade and invcstment;
c ) to maintain the stability and
of the ECU in ite o,iyn right;
good nane, credibility and credit_worthiness
d) to foster the economic arowth of Europ€ and will-being of lts peopre;
e) to sponsor the voluntary adoption of the ECU by governments,businesses and individuals, with the aim of it achieving ultimater-ylega1 tender status in all Member States.
monetary and
(ECU )
value for international
But in the meantLme,
3. Calls on all Member States
on capital flons within the
as soon as possible;
4. Coneidere thqt for the
all Member States must :
and therefore:
(a) urgeg the united Kingdom to joln the EI4s exehange rate mechanism, inthat the extreme volatirity of sterlrng outside this mechanism isdisruptive of that country's trade (46% of which trade ie with otherEEc countries) and of conununlty polrcies and r-nterest.s (e.g. trade ininduBtrial goods and tervices, agriculture, fishlng, etc.);(b) Hopes Greece will join the EMS when the, appropiiate condltrone prevarr,
and considers it eseential that the corununity facilitate creece,s entryby any means n€eeseary including wider divergenc.e margins at the outset,and speclal credit facilities;
(c) Feele that present and future acceesion negotiatlons shouldl incrude con-eideration of EMS memberehip on the appropriate considerations;
to work towards'tfr" fifting of all restrictione
EEc by eliminating artificr-al exchange contrors
future development of European monctary integrationbe full partlclpants in the European Monetary System,
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5' urges all Member states to reaffirm their eommitmenttheir economic,fiscal and monetary policies w,ith the
a) eliminating inflation;
b) providing the base for genuine economic Arotsthi
c ) and thereby affording the opportunity for more andprospects,
towards coordinatinq
agreed atms of
better employment
and asserts that coordination of exchange rate policies (as requiredby the EMS) should be a major element in this field.
6' supports th€ comnlesLon's call to the l'lember stat€s, in its foreword tothe draft fifth medium term economic policy proposals, for them to improveinternal monetary cooperation, to empl0y the Ecu more in their borrowingand lending activities, and to aborish any technicar or statutory ruleewhich etand in ite way;
Furthermore
7 ' stresses the importance of comrnunity regional and social policies tocompensate the l_ess advantaged geographical, economic and social sectorsfor the centrarising effects of such a large unified economic bloc;
8' stresses th'rt the European corununity's worrd responsibilities, especiallyin relation to the Third worrd, will be increases by successful integrationof its economic and monetary policies, and that these resgronibilities mustbe shouldored whql]e_hearte,ily;
Thereforc ca1_ls upon the Commission to:
9. present to bhe parliament and Council an annual review (separated fromthe annuar economic review) of community monetary and currency deveropmentswith particular regard to the EMS, the developing role of the ECU andproqress towards European Monetary integration, incorporatinq proposalsfor Comrnunit.y action;
J0' present within 12 months a aetailed proposal for setting up a Europeancurrency Authority and establishing the Ecu as a community currency inits own right; with Partlcurar regard to ite deqree of autonomv and nolitica,control, the appointment and role of its directors, and its capital structure;
1r' Deverop proposals for a concerted community response to:
a) the effect-s of ,s and ottrer foreign monetary poricies wheretry Lhecommunity acts as one in achieving a mrrtualr.y benef ici a1 accorrlbetween Lhe world's most important economic units i. the ar.ea ofmonetary and exchange rate policy;
b) the probrem of recycling world liquidity to the mrrtuar benefit of theoil states' the industrialised countries and the less deveropecl countries.
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L2. open dlecusslone with the Britleh and Greek governments on the appropriate
terms and eondltlone for their full partlcipatlon in the Etvlsi at the earliest
poseible momentr EDd to do th€ Bane with Spaln and portugal in the normal
process of the aceession negotiationa;
L3. Prepare a programme for the progreesive and complete wlthdrawal of al_I
exchange controls within the EEC;
And calle upon the CouncLl of Ministers to3
L4. Declare in formal terms ite conmitment to European Monetary Integration
and thereby provide a new and strengthened polltical witl to the conetruc-
tion of the European Corununity;
15. Aeks its Preeldent to fonard this resolution to the Commlseion, the
Council of l,linlstere and l,Iember State Governments.
-8- PE 74.894/fin.
BEXPLANATORY STATEMENT
I. Introduction
I. This report, and the motion it supports, will not repeat the content of
previous reports on the subject in all" their technical detail. rt should
be considered as a development of these previous reports and the reader
should certaily refer to them. The Economic and Ivlonetary Affairs Committee
RePort of L980 is particularly valuable and it can be taken as essential
reading on the subjectl. In a separate working document2there wi1l be
found a liet of these precedents, and other l-iterature on the subject,
which can provide useful reference. The Corunission's draft 5th medium
term economic policy prograrnme (cOM (91) 344 final) also contains some
important reflections on the subject in point 4 of the Foreword.
2. Your rapporteur is convinced that the future of European Monetary Union
and of the EMS in particular is much more a political matter than a
technical one. Given the political will to make progress, the technical
problems will be readily solved. How do we elicit that political will on
the part, especially, of l4ember State Governments?
The case for currency stability
It is quite evident that volatility in exchange rates is a major impediment
to commercial intercourse between the countries or currency blocs
concerned.
II. a)
3.
Your rapporteur has been assailed in his constituency work by interests
as diverse as fishermen, farmers, exporters, importers, smal1 and large
industries, on the theme that the volatility and unpredictability of
exchange rates make it very difficult a) to do bus.iness across currency
frontiers and b) to plan investment. A sudden strengthening of their
currency can suck in imports and make contracts quoted in other currencies
unprofi.table when scLtlement is finally made. A sudden weakening can
upset <-rrsl--inqs whcr<. importod raw matcrials or components are concerned.
4. 'lhe problem is no fess acute for governments and central banks who are
tlying to balance t-heir priorities of fighting inflation and unemployment
when their chosen balance is disrupted by the effects of extreme currency
fluctuations and related factors, such as interest rates.
5. ft is clear that movements in cxchan<;c rates can nol be ignorcd complctely
in pursuing domestically either expansionary or contractionary economic
policy. This does not preclude the need for exchange rate adjustments
such as are ;sqsiged to adjust for fundamental divergences in economic
policies and performances. But certainly one can expect the extreme
fluctuations to bc smoothed as t-hey serve no useful purpose in either
commercial or economic terms and can in fact dcny cconomic managers the
rewards of the policies they are pursuing.
Report on the EIvIS as
monetary system Doc.
PE 74.A94/Ann-
an aspect of the international
L-63/8O Rapporteur: Mr G. Ruffolo
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Speculation
The extremes of such fructuati-ons are due to speculative pressures of acrassical and self-fulfirling nature. specuration is an essential factorin any market pIace. But market psychology holds that a trend is boundto continue and therefore it is magnified (in the absence of anyrestraint) untir the reverse trend is set in motion. This trend in itsturn becomes magnified as it becomes commonly accepted as never eoding.
c) &estraint and Smoothi
7' The speculator is less l-iable to take risks where he can identify theexistence of some constraining force. The EMSis such a force, 6s was the Bretton Woods system in abroader arena' But experience with both systems demonstrates that theyare no protection(indeed they can be weak clams before a deluge) whenexpected to stand against fundamental dieeguilibria. Their rore is
circumscribed but none the less usefut in avoiding the short term
extremes of volatility that can be experienced in a completely
unrestrained and free floating regime.
d) Experience with EMS
8' Appendices rrr-xrrr of the working documentr contain graphe and statistics
which amply demonstrate the contrasting rel.ative Etability between those
currenciee prticipating fullv in the EMsi eeehange rate mechanism and the
€ 
eterllngr us dollar and ilapaneEe yen. Even taking into account the occae-ional need for a realignment of Elils parities, it is evident 
-that the traderoperating within this lake of rerative currency stabirity is better placed thanthose operating in and out of it. At the very least the costs of forwardexchange cover wiII be reduced because of less risk and thereforetighter spreads- And although there is a restraint on the freedom ofaction of their economic managers this is certainly as great, arguablygreater, for those managing the free fl0ating currency economies. Forexample the recent extreme downward fructuation of the E sterlingagainst the US doIlar, and then EI4s currencies, has forced an unwercomeincrease in interest rates in order to prevent an even greater downwardslide in the exchange rate and the inflationary impact this would haveon the UK economy.
e ) Conclusi_on
9. your rapporteur is therefore convinced that
i ) extremo exch.enge rate volatility is bad for trade, industrial
<'f f ir: i('.cy, t.con<:mic qrowth and the f ight against inf r-at-ion
and urrenrpJoyrn('nt, cspeciarly in the case of an economy heavilydependent on external trade;
- PE 74.894/Ann.
b)
5.
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ji) such volatility wilr also impcde t-he growth of international tradein general and therefore could instigate a trend to protectionism
and world-wide recession;
iii) it wirr discourage the useful longer term investment of worldliquidity (especiarly the exrremery large balances in the hands
of the oil producing states) and encourage their short termtransfer from one financial centre to another 
- thus furtherdisrupting the worrd monetary and economic scene;
iv) greater relative stabili.ty and the commitments such agreements
imp1y, will not necessariry impede economic management any morethan the opposite will;
v) even if the era of free fl0ating rates has permitted major
readjustments of economic policy to take prace in certain
countries where they were badly needed, there comes a time when
a return to greater stability and exchange rate discipline mustbe made in order to ensure the success of these adjustments;
vi) the uK shouJ-d join the exchange rate mechanism of the EMSforth$rith. Not only would this be beneficial to the UK, itsfishermen, farmers and businessmen, but arso to the countries
already participatingbecause sterLingrs volatility is a factorin the ECU to which their currencies are tied;
vii) as a matter of course, accession agreements for new
should provide means to facilitate their entry into
Gr€ece's interests should be of particular concern i
Medber States
the El,tS and
at the moment;
viii) it is vital to reach some form of
Japan which will help towards the
currency volatility between these
world economy;
agreement with the USA and
reduction of the extremes i.n
three major elements in the
there must be a strong politicar reaffirmation by the Member stateg
of the EEC in the ultimate goal of European monetary and economieintegrat ion;
rc-Iuturg
The EMS, as currently constructed, is only a half-way, or perhaps ruarter_way, house. rt is like stanrling on a wobbry stepping-stone in the middle
of a f.ast-flowing stream. rf the forward momentum is not maintained,
there is a risk that one will be toppled into the water.
The ori-ginal plan tdas that the margins of fluctuation could be gradually
reduced as the community's econonies converged in objectives, management
and performance. rn the end a system of tied currencies could.be reached
- one short step from a single currency. However the further postponement
of Stage If bodes i1I for the future of this route.
Your rapporteur is doubtful if this course is potentialry practicable
within any reasonable time scale 
- above atl because of the evident
ix)
III. A)
I0.
11.
L2.
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divergence in economic ideologies which exist in Europe and the tendency
towards emotionar, if unreasoning, attachment to the trappings of
independent nationhood 
- such as national currencies represent.
tlE_ECll
13.'I'lrere would seem to be a m.rjor role for the ECU in breaking out of
bhis impasse so that the br:nefits of a single currency broc can be
gained while getting round the emotional antagonism that compulsion
cou1d engender.
14. It would be preferable to offer the facilities of the ECU as a European
currency wlth a stability guaranteel to be taken up voluntarily by those
who see it as usefur to their purposes. rf properly and responsibly
managed, it is rikely that central banks (not only in the EEc), inter-
national traders (not only in the EEC), businesses, tourists and. thus
the population at large, will avaiL themselves of it as a means of
exchange settlement and store of value. The only fonnal l-eglslatlve
step required of member governments at an appropriate moment, would be
to make the ECU legal tender in their countries alongside the national
currency and to eliminate intra-EEC exchange controls.
To achieve this end, we cal 1 on the Commission to bring forward proposals
to set up the ECU as a currency in its own right and under the control of
an independently chartered European Currency Authority (see point 2 of
I,lotion for a Resolution).
c) Regional an{ gocial imbaLarrccs
15. We accept that a unified economic an<l monetary bloc on the scale of
the EEC will present problems of regional and social disparities. It
is therefore vitaL that any move towards greater monetary integration
should be coupled with regional and social policies that can recirculate
resources within the community and promote convergence of living
standards at a high 1eve1. The role of the Community budget is central
to this activity. Its scope must be adequate and its bal-ance adjusted
to achieve essential policy aims, as well as to promote econornic
growt ll (), tlro Commun ity as a whole.
Paral.LeI wiLh the budget itseff, the European Investment Bank and g
European Monetary Fund would have important roles in fueling genuine
economi,c growth and counteracting monetary imbalances.
d ) ne-p_or.1!,qg
16 - The monetary system is so central to future construction of the European
Community that it would be benefj-cial if the Commission could undertake
to make a regular annual report to Parl-iament and Council on monetary
and currency developments and the progress towards monetary i.ntegration,
with particular Vegard to the EMS and ECU.
b)
I th" idea of an indexed
Saints Day Manifesto,
currency is explored in the
see Bibliography in Working
so-caIIed All
Document PE 74.894/Ann"
PE 74.894/fLn.-t2-
17. This would provide an opp()rtunity formonitoring progress, inst_iIIing
political considerations and exerLinq democrative control by the two
bodies wl'rit'tr diroctly and incllrecbly reF)r'cr;()nt thr. wirihcs ancl ,rs1ri r.;rt irrls
of the peopJe of llrrrol-rc.
fV.The Essentials
18. The Eu!'opean Community worrld never have started without political will
and foresight. Its continttation and development depends on political will
and foresight. This is no different in the monetary fieId. In fact its
critical importance to the future of Europe requires especial concentration
of political will.
19. Your rapPorteur presents this Motion for a Resolution in the hope it
will broach some taboos, touch some responsive chords and heJ.p towards a
, European cornmunity which can be seen by arl its people to be finding
answers to the major political, economic and social difficulties of
the ]980s and beyond.
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MOIION FOR A RESOLUTION (Doc" L-76L/BO)
tabled by !{:r RIIFFOLO, Mr ZAGARI, llr COLLA, lllr DIDO, Ylt LEZZI, Illr PIITIKAN,
IvIr ORLAbTDI, I,Ir SIEGLERSCHI,IIDT, Mr \fERNIMMEN, Illr Bruno FRIEDRICH, It[r IIINSCH
Ir4r ARNDT, I{rs WEBER, I4r RIEGER, Mr ARFE, IUtr GLINNE, Irlrs FOCKE, trtr KUItri[,
lllr DANIKERT, I,Ir trANGE, I4r GABERT, Mr von der VRING, Ilr VAt{ MINNEN and
!,Ir COIIEN
pureuant to RuIe 25 of t'he Rules of Procedure
on the EuroPean !4oneatrY Syst€m
The European Parliament,
- 
having regard to the deliberations of the European council
at its last meeting on 1,/2 December 1980'
1. Expresses its profound and complete dissatisfaction at the declsion
to defer the transition to Ehe second stage of the European Flonetary
Sys tem;
2. Points out Ehat the reasons invoked to justify this decision, which
was taken after the European Council had twice solemnllr confirmed and
reaff.i511ad its commitmenE, can only be regarded as an attcnlpt to jttstify
the Council's utter failure as regards the objectives set when the EllS
wars .sr-ablished;
3. Notes that no practical measures have been taken to bring about the
process of gradual convergence of t)re Member StaEes' economies which
was supposed to accompany and facilitate the transition to a Phase of
more advanced monetary integration, which in turn would have given this
process an additional boost, chiefly through the seEEing-uP of the
European l,lonetarY Pund ;
4. Reiterates the view it expressed on a previous occasion in its resolution
of L6/L7.4.BO on the precarious nature of the EIvIS in its present stage,
in which it remains vulnerable to strong external Pressures owing to the
absence of a common policy tor^ards Ehe dollar, and to strong rnbernal
pressures resulting from insufficient eoordination of economic polieies
and the Iack of a substanEial CommuniEy rnonetary reserve enabling the
consequences thereof to be attenuated;
5. Considers that in t.hese circumstances Ehe prolongation of this precarious
phase of the EMS is likely to accentuate tshe system's basic weakness,
namely t-hat iE imposes on Meniber States obligations whieh, owing to the
asymmetrical nature of the system, place a particutarly heavy burden on
.:i 
- 
- :: cnomi.cally weak countr:ies, instead of pursuing t,he c'biect'ives and
policies necessary to ensure the convergent developmenE of the CommuniEy's
economies;
6. R<:ques t-s the Commission Eo submit
possible a rePort on the reasons
Council's decision.
Eo the European ltarl i irmen L as soon as
for and implications of Ehe EuroPean
L4- PE 74.894/fLn/t
